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INTRODUCTION

The importance of future energy sources for continued global development is indisputable. Many authorities believe that the next
major war will be fought over the control of the world's vital energy
resources.1 Presumably, the nation which can claim the best supply
of energy will be ultimately victorious. 2 The Soviet gas pipeline represents a mechanism which may enable the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (U.S.S.R. or Soviet Union) to increase its sphere of influence and power in two distinct ways. First, by providing a significant
portion of Europe's energy needs, the Soviet Union will gain increased control over the area. Second, the Soviet Union will also gain
revenue and technology which will aid it in the development of oil
* J.D., 1985, University of Florida.
1. Rooney, 1995: The Year of Reckoning for American and Soviet Energy Policies, 105
PuB. UTrn FORT., Jan. 17, 1980, at 21-22.
2. Id.
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and gas resources for domestic use.2
After the Soviet pipeline is completed, it will measure 3500 miles
in length, and is projected to supply 40 to 70 million cubic meters of
natural gas per year to various European countries.' The Soviets and
Europeans have entered into an interesting financing agreement. The
Europeans are financing the construction of the pipeline by providing
the necessary equipment and technology. The U.S.S.R. will repay
this debt at a 7.75 percent interest rate over a ten-year period by
supplying an equal value of natural gas to the European countries.5
The estimated cost of the pipeline project to the U.S.S.R. is $10 billion. This figure includes the amount that European companies will
earn from pipeline-related contracts with the Soviet Union.'
Authorities project that the Soviet Union would soon be supplying approximately thirty-five percent of western Europe's gas requirements. This raises the unwelcomed probability of the European
nations' dependency on the Soviet Union for vital energy resources.:
This situation has created friction between East and West and serious disagreement between European and American allies. The
Europeans' primary concern is that the pipeline represents an opportunity to alleviate the economic problems of their hard-pressed private sector. The United States, however, is concerned with the increased dependency upon Russia resulting in a concurrent
realignment of sympathies. These conflicting interests are vividly
demonstrated by President Reagan's 1981 embargo of pipeline-related products to the U.S.S.R. This sanction raised serious transnational legal problems for Europe, the Soviet Union and the United
States.
3. Id.
4. Proposed Trans-Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline, 1981: Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (report by Miriam
Karr and Roger W. Robinson, Jr. on Soviet Gas: Risk or Reward?) [hereinafter cited as 1981
Hearings].
5. A Buyer's Market for SiberianGas, THE ECONOMIST, June 6, 1981, at 85. This
westernfinanced pipeline would give the U.S.S.R the opportunity to pay for most of its debt to the
West by the mid-1980's from the hard currency earnings of $15-22 billion annually. Id. See also
1981 Hearings, supra note 4, at 210 (statement by Anthony H. Cordesman, Fellow of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars).
6. Economic Relations with the Soviet Union, 1982: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Economic Policy & the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 45
(1982) (statement of Bradley Graham) [hereinafter cited as 1982 Hearings].
7. 1981 Hearings, supra note 4, at 5 (statement by Anthony H. Cordesman). West Germany would be dependent on the U.S.S.R. for up to 30% of its gas and 6% of its total energy
supplies. The French would be dependent for 25% - 30% of their total gas supplies and 4% of
their total energy. The Austrians would be dependent for 18% of their total energy supply;
Belgium 8%, Italy 5% and 4% for the Netherlands. Id at 49.
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II. BACKGROUND

On December 29, 1981, in retaliation for the Soviet Union's activities in Poland, President Reagan utilized the Export Administration
Act of 1979 (E.E.A.) s and imposed an embargo on all exports of oil,
gas and other high technology equipment by United States firms to
the U.S.S.R. The scope of this Presidential ban was expanded on
June 18, 1982, to include foreign subsidiaries of American firms and
foreign firms producing oil and gas pursuant to an authorized United
States license.9 These sanctions were intended to halt or at least delay the continued construction of the Soviet or Yamal pipeline. 10
This embargo encountered vehement opposition in western Europe where its effects were harshest. The rhetoric surrounding this
opposition vividly illustrated the predicament in which these United
States-affiliated corporations found themselves."' If a corporation
chose to ignore the Presidential embargo, Reagan would be authorized by the E.A.A. to impose civil, criminal or administrative penalties on both the corporation and its board of directors. Conversely,
obedience to the Presidential mandate could result in Soviet retaliation in the form of litigation for breach of contract and disqualification from consideration for future contracts.12 European governments
also opposed the embargo for economic reasons. The European economy, which was in a recession, 13 was highly dependent upon the con8. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2402 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See also Sandeis, Trying to Outbluff Reagan in the Pipeline Poker Game, Bus. Wy., Aug. 16, 1982, at 42. In West Germany,
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt is having political problems based upon a "budget crunch" and
major debates over appropriations. French President Mitterrand faces funding problems regarding a 25% increase in social welfare payments. He also has devalued the franc twice and
presently needs investment cash to pour into newly nationalized companies. France faces an
inflation rate of 14%. In Britain, Prime Minister Thatcher must contend with the banking
community, which is a major advocate of the pipeline deal. The community believes that the
Soviet Union will be able to repay the debts owed to the West by earning hard currency
through use of the pipeline. Yet Britain is not a major partner in the pipeline deal, earning less
than 400 million. Italy also faces a grave economic recession. Italy is just beginning to penetrate
United States markets; thereby beginning its debt repayment to the United States. Id.
9. Amendment of Oil & Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 15 C.F.R. §§ 376.12, 379.8, 385.2
(1982). This includes exports of non-United States goods, technical equipment by United
States-owned or controlled companies wherever organized or doing business, and foreign-produced products of United States technical data not previously subject to control.
10. 1982 Hearings, supra note 6, at 44 (statement of Edward A. Hewett).
11. EscalatingHostilities Over the Pipeline Ban, Bus. Wi., Sept. 6, 1982, at 31 [hereinafter cited as Hostilities].
12. 15 C.F.R. §§ 387 & 388.3 (1982). The Act imposes a fine up to $50,000 or five times
the involved exports' value, whichever is greater, or imprisonment for not more than five years
or both for a knowing violation. 50 U.S.C. app § 2410(a) (1976 & Supp. m 1979). The penalty
increases to $100,000 ($250,000 for an individual) or five times the involved exports' value or 10
years imprisonment or both for willful violation. Id. § 2410(b).
13. Hostilities, supra note 11, at 31.
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tinued well-being of its private sector, and the loss of this pipelinerelated revenue would have resulted in serious consequences.
Recognizing this dilemma, the President offered to repeal the embargo in return for specific concessions. 14 Reagan first demanded that
the Europeans impose a more restrictive credit policy towards the
Soviets and abolish all subsidies on trade with the U.S.S.R."5 Reagan's demand included a requirement that all credit agreements in
excess of $70,000 had to be submitted to COCOM for approval.16 Additionally, Reagan asked for a tightening of the COCOM rules which
limit the sale or transfer of technology to the U.S.S.R. This restriction was intended to reduce the possibility that technology sold to
the Soviet Union would be used on the pipeline for military purposes.
The final demand required the Europeans to abandon all plans of
helping the Soviet Union build a second, parallel pipeline.18 All of
these demands were soundly rejected by the Europeans. 9
The House of Representatives passed a bill on September 29,
1982, to help alleviate some of the hardships imposed upon United
States-affiliated corporations by the President's actions.20 Rather
than enact a bill which directly overturned the embargo, the House
passed a bill which extended indirect help to these corporations. 2'
This bill would have allowed the President to continue imposing
sanctions under the E.A.A. for national security reasons, but not for
foreign policy reasons 2 2 It also would have helped the defendant corporations in their litigation against the United States because of the
14. Maechling, Siberian Pipe Dream, 233 Eui. 4, 4-5 (Sept.-Oct. 1982). The Italian government has ordered its companies to honor their contracts. Britain invoked a trade law passed
in 1980 which makes it illegal for companies based in Britain to go along with certain foreign
laws and sanctions. The French government cited high court rulings proclaiming the supremacy

of French law when it conflicts with foreign laws. The French have threatened their companies
with heavy fines, jail sentences and seizure of the compressors which the French government
would ship independently. Id. See also That Pipeline: Are Retrospective Sanctions Legal?,
THE ECONOMIST, July 31, 1982, at 40 [hereinafter cited as That Pipeline].
15. No Compromise in the Pipeline, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 18, 1982, at 45 [hereinafter
cited as No Compromise]. This would include cheap credits and noncommercial export-credit

guarantees. The United States also wants the Soviet Union to make larger down payments to
the West, increasing them from the present 15% of the value to 30-40% in the future. Id.
16. Id. COCOM is an organization of 15 NATO nations plus Japan which collaborated in
regulating exports of armaments, strategic materials and military technology of potential use to
Communist countries. Maechling, supra note 14, at 5.
17. Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 1. The United States would require a two-thirds

majority of COCOM countries to veto any contract provided to them. Id.
18. No Compromise, supra note 15.
19. Id.
20. Pipeline Sanctions: Revolt Comes Home, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 28, 1982, at 30 [hereinafter cited as Sanctions].
21. Id.
22. Id.
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difficulty the government would have in proving that the pipeline was
a threat to national security. The House chose this form of bill to
avoid a Presidential veto which would have met any attempt to directly overturn the embargo. However, the Senate never voted on the
bill because the President acted before it could be submitted.
Possibly as a result of the political pressures, President Reagan
lifted the embargo on November 13, 1982. Subsequently, he unilaterally imposed a trade agreement. 23 The policy of this agreement purported to be a study of "technology transfers from West to East, the
granting of credit to Communist countries, and Western energy imports from the Soviet Union in the future." ' This so-called "agreement" has never been accepted by any European country and therefore has dubious enforceability.

III.

EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF

1979

Any consideration of the controversy surrounding the Soviet pipeline embargo must include a brief examination of the Export Administration Act. The E.A.A. was enacted by Congress in 1979. It authorizes the President to "prohibit the exportation of any articles
subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S. ''2 5 The President delegates this
authority to the Department of Commerce, which effectuates any
such prohibition. 26 Congress' articulated goal in enacting this legislation was to use export controls to restrict the export of goods and
technology "which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which
would prove detrimental to the national security of the United
States; and where necessary to further significantly the foreign policy
of the U.S. or to fulfill its declared international obligations....
The E.A.A. represents a significant boost to the executive's power
base. It provides additional justification for unilateral action on
problems within the foreign policy realm.28 Congress has designated
23. Pipeline:A Pipe of Peace as Smoky as War, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 20, 1982, at 20, 21.
The Europeans referred to this trade agreement as a "non-paper" requiring neither signatures
"nor any initialing." No country formally agreed to it, including the United States, and it was
never meant to be implemented. Id.
24. Id.
25. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2401-2402 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).

26. Id.
27.
28.

Id.
Maechling, supra note 14, at 4. Congress' criteria for implementing the Export Ad-

ministration Act controls are as follows:
(1) [Tlhe controls should have a favorable chance of working if they are to be used, (2)
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certain criteria as prerequisites to the implementation of the Act, but
these have little restrictive effect. The President has no duty to report to Congress before imposing an embargo and has no obligation
to consult with our allies.2 9 The E.A.A. therefore extended explicit
authorization to President Reagan to impose the sanctions that he
chose.

IV.

DRESSER INDUSTRIES

The plight of the United States-affiliated corporations engaged in
the production of pipeline products is vividly illustrated by an examination of the litigation and problems faced by one such corporation,
Dresser Industries of France. Dresser France is a French corporation
with its main office and manufacturing plant in France. 30 It is, however, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dresser Industries, a Dallas-based
corporation organized under the laws of Delaware." On September
28, 1981, Dresser France contracted with Creusot Loire, a company
controlled by the French government, and V/O Machinoimport, a Soviet-controlled company.32 Dresser France agreed to make twentyone gas compressors for the Soviet-West European gas pipeline which
was being built in part by Creusot Loire.33 Dresser France used
United States technical data provided by Dresser Industries' Clark
Division in New York prior to December 31, 1981, the effective date
of the original export controls prohibiting the export of this data
from the United States. 3 4 Prior to June 22, 1982, the effective date of
the second embargo, Dresser had completed three of the planned
twenty-one compressors. 5 At the effective date of the second embargo, Dresser France halted production as recommended by its parthere should be consistency between control policies and other U.S. foreign policies toward the target nation, (3) the reaction of other nations should be considered before
imposing controls, (4) the impact of controls on U.S. competitiveness must be evaluated,
(5) we should have the ability to enforce the controls, and (6) the consequences of not
imposing controls should be considered.
1982 Hearings,supra note 6, at 196 (statement of Alexander B. Trowbridge).
29. Maechling, supra note 14, at 4.
30. Irr'L TRADE REP., U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 1, at 25 (Oct. 5, 1982).
31. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Baldridge, No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. filed Oct. 20, 1982). Dresser
France is almost entirely owned by Dresser A.G., a Liechtenstein Corporation. Dresser A. G. is
owned by Dresser Industries.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34.
1982).
35.

Id. See also Ilrr'L TaDE REP., U.S. EXPORT WEEKLY (BNA) No. 1, at 25, 26 (Oct. 5,
Dresser Indus., No. 82-2385.
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ent corporation, Dresser Industries." On August 23, 1982, the French
government ordered Dresser France to comply with the terms of the
contract or face sanctions.37 Dresser France sued in the Federal District Court of the District of Columbia for declaratory and injunctive
relief against the United States alleging that neither the E.E.A. nor
any international legal theories authorized the imposition of penalties
for violations of the embargo. Dresser France also contended that the
penalties would "deprive them from property without due process." 35
The district court denied its motion for a temporary restraining order.39 On August 23, 1982, in defiance of the embargo, Dresser France
shipped the three compressors on board a French ship and resumed
work on the remaining compressors.4 0 Ultimately the embargo was
lifted by President Reagan and all litigation associated with the
Dresser France situation was discontinued. However, the district
court's denial of Dresser France's motion for a temporary restraining
order had serious implications for future litigation in this area and
for international legal theory in general. An exploration of the issues
raised in this case will help elucidate the conflicting arguments prevailing in this area.

V.

INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORIES OF JURISDICTION

It appears that President Reagan's imposition of the embargo was
squarely within his authority under the E.A.A. However, it is arguable that his actions constitute a violation of customary international
law. Four well recognized principles of international law are applicable to this case. The territoriality principle states that "each nation
has the right to regulate political, economic and social activities
within the confines of its territorial borders.'

1

This principle incor-

porates the notion that a nation state should only regulate those persons and goods situated within its boundaries."2 This in turn encompasses the notion that a sovereign has the sole authority to prescribe
and enforce laws within its national boundaries.
The nationality principle authorizes the application of a country's
laws to a national of the country wherever he is located, when the
36.

Id.

37. Id.
38. INT'L TRADE REP., U.S. ExPor
39. Id.

WEEKLY (BNA) No. 1, at 25, 26 (Oct. 5, 1982).

40. Id.
41. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FORmEGN RELATIONS LAW OP THE US. § 17 (1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
42. Id.
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rights of other nations or nationals are not infringed upon.43 This
principle is based on the notion that sovereigns possess unlimited
power, and limitations on power should not be presumed. Also, the
obligations of citizenship justify a retention of jurisdiction even
though the person is not physically present." The nationality of corporations is determined by reference to the place of incorporation
and location of the corporation's registered office.4 5
The protective principle is a theory of jurisdiction based on injury
to the national interest. This principle holds that a country is justified in prescribing acts committed outside of its territorial borders
when those acts threaten either the state's security or the operation
of its governmental functions. 4' This is often the justification used
when a country chooses to intercept a ship suspected of carrying
drugs before it enters its territorial waters. The acts sought to be prescribed must usually constitute either a crime or tort under the laws
of the state seeking to exert jurisdiction for the exertion of authority
to be proper.
Finally, the effects doctrine states that conduct which occurs
outside the territory may be prescribed if it causes direct foreseeable
and substantial effects upon that territory. 8 This policy is justified
by the theory that a sovereign should have power to exert control
over activity which results in discernable impact within the sovereign's territory even if the actual activity occurred outside it. Again,
the activity concerned must reach the level of a crime or tort in order
to qualify under this doctrine.49

VI.

EXTRATERRITORIALITY-FOREIGN LICENSES

The specific issue raised here is whether the United States has
authority under international law theories to exert export control
over foreign companies with respect to their re-export of United
States-origin goods or technology, or their export of foreign-origin
goods incorporating American parts or technology.
The American embargo of Soviet pipeline equipment and technology is unacceptable under international law principles because of its
extraterritorial infringement of foreign-based companies. President
43. Id.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Nationality as defined applies to persons and not goods.
Goods and technology have no nationality.

§33.
§18.

49. Id.
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Reagan has attempted to regulate non-American companies whose
only substantive connection with the United States is the technological data purchased from the United States. The Dresser case provides a typical example of the inequity involved in applying the embargo in this type of situation. The only connections between Dresser
France and the United States are first, that Dresser France is a subsidiary of an American company, Dresser Industries; and, second,
that Dresser France used United States technical data transferred to
it in 1976 under a valid export license.50 Otherwise, Dresser France
has had no contact with the United States. The contract for the compressors for the pipeline was negotiated and executed in France, the
compressors were manufactured in France using French materials,
the compressors were shipped from France to the U.S.S.R. by a
French ship, and none of the parties to the contract were
Americans."1
The courts have generally used two legal theories when deciding
whether the government may enforce federal statutes outside United
States' boundaries. 2 The first approach is the "multivariable comity
analysis" approach."3 Under this approach, three requirements must
be met. First, there has to be an actual or intended effect on American foreign commerce as a result of extraterritorial action.5 4 Second,
there must be a substantially large effect resulting in a cognizable
injury. Third, the interests of the United States and the defendants'
links to the United States must be sufficiently strong in comparison
to those of other nations in order to justify the extraterritorial exercise of authority. 5
Applying this approach, the embargo does not meet any of the
elements of the test. The sale by Dresser France of the compressors
for the pipeline has a minimal effect, if any, on the United States.56
50. Vance, Recent Developments, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 203, 208 (1982).
51. Id. at 208. The parties to the contract were Dresser France, Creusot Loire, and V/O
Machinoimport.
52. Timberlane Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 615 (9th Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 615.
54. Id.
55. Id.
The elements to be weighed include the nationality or allegiance of the parties and
the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of
the effects in the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the foreseeability of such
effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the
United States as compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614.
56. Vance, supra note 50, at 210. The three compressors have a value of less than two
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Also, Dresser France7 has more substantial links with France than it
does with America.

The second and more commonly used approach is the "clear congressional intent" approach. 88 This approach makes clear congressional intent necessary to support the extraterritorial application of
United States law. 9 Courts usually construe federal statutes strictly
in this area so as to avoid conflicts with international law theories.0°
Courts also must give effect to congressional orders regardless of
whether they violate international law.8 1 But "acts of Congress are
presumed to conform to principles of international law in the absence
of clear congressional intent to the contrary." 2 The E.A.A. does not
authorize extraterritorial application of any of its statutes or regulations. 8 In addition, no authority exists under the Act's definition of
persons or statutes to which it applies. 4 This definition applies only
to persons or entities subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States.6 5 Thus, Congress has restricted the scope of the Act's enforcement to territorial boundaries of the United States and to extraterritorial activities which significantly affect American foreign commerce.68 Dresser France's activities did not occur within United
States territorial boundaries and, as stated previously, did not have a
significant effect upon American foreign commerce. Thus, the President's inclusion of "all foreign corporations owned or controlled by
87
U.S. nationals" exceeds congressional intent.
Advocates for the extraterritorial application of American law armillion dollars. The projected impact upon American businesses from the export controls is
approximately two billion dollars. Thus, the three compressors represent less than one-tenth of
one percent of the total value of United States exports affected by the export regulation. Id.
57. Id. As stated before, the only connections between the United States and Dresser
France are Dresser France's status as an American company's subsidiary and its use of United
States' technical data. Dresser France is a French corporation manufacturing the compressors
in France. The compressors never touched United States soil, and the contract and parties are
located outside the United States. Id.
58. FTC v. Compaignie de Saint-Gobain-Port-a-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1304 (D.C. Cir.
1980); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1032 n.9 (N.D. Ohio
1981).
59. FTC, 636 F.2d at 1304.
60. Id. at 1323.
61. Id.
62. Vance, supra note 50, at 211.
63. Matter of District of Columbia Workmen's Comp. Act., 554 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
64. See 50 U.S.C. app §§ 2401-2420 (1979).
65. Amendment to Oil & Gas Controls to the U.S.S.R., 15 C.F.R. § 385.2(c)(2)(iv) (1982).
66. Vance, supra note 50. This is known as the effects doctrine. FTC, 636 F.2d at 1316
n.85. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
67. Vance, supra note 50, at 212.
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gue that foreign companies which obtain a validated export license"8
have agreed to voluntarily submit to United States jurisdiction.6 9
This argument can be countered by acknowledging that in order to
obtain American technology, a foreign company must submit itself to
American export laws and that this "voluntary" submission should
have no effect on international law principles.
In conclusion, the United States may blacklist foreign corporations by preventing them from buying American technology and
equipment. However, under international law, the United States
lacks enforcement jurisdiction to impose export restrictions upon
these companies.7°

VII. NATIONALITY PRINCIPLE-FOREIGN SUBSIDIARIES
Application of the nationality principle raises the issue of whether
the United States can impose export controls upon the export of foreign-origin goods by foreign subsidiaries of American companies
under international law. The E.E.A. authorizes the President to "prohibit.., the exportation ... of any articles subject to the jurisdiction
of the United States or exported by any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States."7 1 Foreign subsidiaries are encompassed
in the statutory definition of a United States person. 2 But under the
E.A.A. the definition of a United States person does not include
those of foreign subsidiaries. Thus, it can be argued that the President did not have authority to exert this control over foreign
73
subsidiaries.
Another doctrine that should be examined is the doctrine of sovereign compulsion developed under antitrust law. 4 This is a defense
68. Soviet-European Gas Pipeline, 1982: HearingsBefore the Senate Subcomm. on Int'l
Economic Policy of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of
Stanley J. Marcuss, Esq., Partner, Mitbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy). There are two types of
licenses which now can be obtained under current United States export control laws. The first
type is a general license. This is one in which no application is required and no document is
issued. Under this type of license, there is no restriction upon re-export. A validated license,
which is the type Dresser Industries obtained, is a document which authorizes a specific export
in accordance with the terms of the license. Id. at 30.
69. The United States' right to sanction them rests upon the companies' contractual commitment or implied consent not to violate these regulations. Butler, The ExtraterritorialReach
of the United States Export Administration Act, 1983 J. Bus. L. 275, 278 (May).
70. RESTATEMENT (SECoND), supra note 41, § 402 (Tent Draft No. 2, 1981).
71. 50 U.S.C. app §§ 2404(a)(1) & 2406(e)(1) (1982).
72. Id. app. § 2415(2).
73. Id.
74. Butler, supra note 69, at 277. This doctrine has been used as a basis for rejection of
an antitrust suit in only one case. International Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Marracaibo, Inc., 307 F.
Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
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to sanctions based upon governmental compulsion under the foreign
countries' laws. This would apply in the DresserIndustries case since
the French government had threatened to apply sanctions and to penalize Dresser France if it complied with the United States
embargo. 5
76
A method that some courts use is a judicial balancing test.
Courts look at factors including the degree of conflict with foreign
law, the nationality of the parties involved, the likelihood of compliance with federal law, and the comparative effects of applying competing laws." Using a balancing test in the context of the E.A.A., a
judicial determination not to exercise jurisdiction does not end litigation. It merely means that the administrative act which is challenged
is not overturned. 8 If the court decides to exercise jurisdiction, then
the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relation Law, section 40, provides an additional balancing test under which a court exercises
"good faith consideration" in determining whether international law
obligations require the United States to moderate its enforcement
jurisdiction.
The Restatement (Second) further provides under section 402
that a state may have jurisdiction to prescribe and apply its law, subject to section 403, to conduct which takes place within its territory,
to persons within its territory, to conduct outside its territory which
is intended to have an effect within its territory, to conduct or relations of its nationals outside its territory, or to conduct outside its
territory by persons not nationals whose conduct is directed against
the security of the state or state interests. The exception to section
402 under section 403 is that even though basis for jurisdiction exists
under section 402, a state may not apply its law to persons or things
which have a connection with the state if the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable.7
75. Vance, supra note 50, at 210.
76. Butler, supra note 69, at 277.
77. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614. See also Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,
595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979).
78. Butler, supra note 72, at 278.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 41, §§ 402 & 403 (Revised Draft Mar. 27, 1981).
Whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable is judged by examining the following

factors:
IT]he extent to which the activity takes place within the regulating state or has direct,
foreseeable, and substantial effects upon or in the regulating state, the link between the

regulating state and the principals primarily responsible for the activity to be regulated
or between that state and those whom the law or regulation is designed to protect, the
character and importance of the activity to be regulated, the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation to the international political,

legal, or economic system, the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the tradi-
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Thus, the international law doctrine of nationality would not provide a basis for jurisdiction here.8 0 It cannot be assumed that merely
because a foreign company is owned by a United States company or
by American shareholders, that the subsidiary is a United States national.8 ' Dresser France is an American subsidiary but it is incorporated and has its registered office in France.8 2 All of its business is
done outside of the United States. The only contact it has with the
United States is the technology it bought from Dresser Industries
and the subsidiary status. Thus, the nationality doctrine should not
justify asserting control over foreign subsidiaries of United States
corporations."

VIII.

RETROACTIVE APPLICATION

Under the Soviet pipeline control sanctions, the United States imposed retroactive restrictions on both foreign companies and unaffiliated foreign companies which had exported goods and technology
from the United States at a time when it was permissible to re-export
such goods or technology to the Soviet Union without further American consent.8 ' Thus, no legal constraints existed at the time these
companies entered into their contracts for the pipeline.86 The host
government of these companies approved the sale of equipment and
technology and were angered by the United States sanctions.8 Additionally, the laws in these countries favored the harmony of contractual commitments and disciplined the failure to honor those commit87
ments with penalties.
The federal government lacked authority to impose these restrictions because none of the principles of international law supported
tions of the international system, the extent to which another state may have an interest
in regulating the activity and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by other states.
And finally, an exercise of jurisdiction may still be unreasonable if it requires a person to
take action that would violate a regulation of another state that is not unreasonable
under that state's criteria.
Id. § 403.
80. Id. § 402 comment.
81. Id. § 402(3) comment (d).
82. Most international courts looking at the issue of a corporation's nationality use two
criteria: the place of incorporation and the place of the concerned company's registered office.
European Committee Comments on the U.S. Regulations ConcerningTrade with the U.S.S.R.,
21 INr'L LE AL MATEaRALS 1, 4 (July 1982).
83. Vance, supra note 50, at 208.

84. 47 Fed. Reg. 27,250 (1982).
85. Butler, supra note 69, at 279.
86. Embargo: Who Has Reagan's Ear?, Bus. WKn, Aug. 16, 1982, at 80.
87.

Butler, supra note 69, at 280.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1986

13

FLORIDA

Florida JournalINTERNATIONAL
of International Law, LAW
Vol. 2, JOURNAL
Iss. 1 [1986], Art. 2

[Vol. II

its action. The nationality principle only justifies the assertion of jurisdiction over a branch or a subsidiary of an American corporation.88
The government justified its assertion of jurisdiction on the grounds
that the foreign companies originally bought the goods or technology
from the United States and, based upon a continuing relationship between the non-American company and the American company, these
foreign companies have subjected themselves to United States jurisdiction. 9 This assertion of jurisdiction is tenuous. No statutory or
regulatory precedent establishes United States jurisdiction over previously exported goods or technology. Also, no statutory or regulatory
precedent establishes that a non-American corporation becomes subject to the jurisdiction of the United States based upon a license
agreement with an American company.9 0 If these companies had
agreed to comply with the E.A.A., then results might have been different. Dresser France used United States technical data transferred
to it in 1976 under a valid export license. 1 It had built three of the
compressors and had prepared them for shipment before the enactment of the sanctions. 9 2 After the sanctions were imposed, Dresser
France stopped production and shipment but the French government
ordered it to comply with its contracts. 3 Dresser was left with no
other choice but to comply with the government's laws in the place of
its incorporation, in the place where the equipment was manufactured and in the place in which the contract was made; namely,
France.
Under territoriality principles, the United States lacked jurisdiction. Since goods and technology have no nationality, jurisdiction
cannot be asserted on the basis that the goods originated in United
States territory.9 4 When a foreign company buys technology or goods
from the United States and has no other connection with the United
States, the United States is overextending its territorial bounds when
it exercises jurisdiction.

IX.

CONSTITUTIONALITY-DUE

PROCESS CLAUSE

The constitutionality of the federal government's extension of jurisdiction in the pipeline situation rests on two arguments. The first
88.

Moyer & Mabry, Export Controls as Instruments of Foreign Policy: The History,

Legal Issues and Policy Lessons of Three Recent Cases, 15 GEo. L.J. 1, 113 (1983).
89. Butler, supra note 69, at 280.
90. Id.
91. Vance, supra note 50, at 208.
92. Dresser Indus., No. 82-2385 (D.D.C. filed Oct 20, 1982).
93. Id.
94. Moyer & Mabry, supra note 88.
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argument is that the E.E.A. authorizes the regulation of technology
that is "subject to the jurisdiction of the U.S."9 5 However, the Restatement (Second) and international law principles do not hold that
American jurisdiction over United States-origin goods and technology
continues indefinitely. 96
The second argument is that by originally consenting to comply
with federal restrictions as to export licenses, the foreign company
must comply with all American regulations. Therefore, since the
United States has the authority to control the original exports from
this country, it also has a right to control the re-export of those goods
or technology outside of the Unted States." Under Weaver v. Graham, the Supreme Court held that "even if a statute merely alters
penal provisions accorded by the grade of the legislature, it violates
the [ex post facto] clause if it is both retrospective and more onerous
than the law in effect on the date of the offense."9 8 The rationale for
this policy is that it allows people to rely upon existing law. 99
Dresser France charged in its complaint that the retroactive effect
of the law deprived it of property without due process of law. 100 If the
sanctions against Dresser France had been enforced, including suspension of its export license, the United States would have "divested
rights which came into concrete existence before.., the date of [the
regulation's] effect," and this would have violated the due process
doctrine.1 01 In order to avoid the United States sanctions, Dresser
France would have had to breach its contract and face possible sanctions by both the French and Soviet governments. Dresser France
could not have avoided a loss of property rights, and the combination
of economic and2 equitable factors pointed to a finding of a due pro10
cess violation.
Another due process issue favoring Dresser France's position was
that the government could not impose criminal or civil penalties
95.

50 U.S.C. app §§ 2404(a) & 2405(a) (Supp. II 1981).

96.
97.
98.

Moyer & Mabry, supra note 88.
15 C.F.R. §§ 374.1-374.9, 376.12 & 379.8 (1982).
450 U.S. 17, 24 (1981).

Laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the event,
or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive and ... the criminal quality attributable to an act, either by the legal definition of the offense or by the nature or amount of
the punishment imposed for its commission, should not be altered by legislative enactment, after the fact, to the disadvantage of the accused.
Id. See also Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 218 (1925).
99. 450 U.S. at 28-29.
100. Vance, supra note 50, at 214.
101. South East Chicago Comm'n, 448 F.2d 1122 (1978).
102. Id. at 1123 n.3 (citing Thorpe v. Housing Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280 n.35 (1969)).
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through administrative procedures."' 3 Court action is required to impose such penalties. 104 The Department of Commerce, which
threatened "administrative and other sanctions," may only impose a
denial of export privileges and a fine of up to $10,000, without court
action.1 0 5 Dresser France received a letter from the Commerce Department before trial which threatened to impose administrative

sanctions and other such sanctions.106

X.

THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE

Aside from the jurisdictional and constitutional problems, tension
increased between the Europeans and the United States because of
the sanctions.10 7 The Europeans contend that the pipeline would provide necessary energy for European countries in need of oil and
gas.1 08 Few countries other than the U.S.S.R. could supply the necessary quantity of gas. 0 9 Additionally, the West would be saving western energy resources and while depleting Soviet supplies.11 0 The
Europeans also contend that since they will inevitably become dependent for energy supplies, they should perhaps reduce this dependency
by splitting their purchases between the Middle East and the Soviet
Union.1 1 Even when gas is flowing in the pipeline in 1990, the estimates are that less than four percent of the European community's
total energy consumption will come from the Yamal pipeline.
The Europeans also state that the sanctions will hurt them more
than the Soviets. 2 First, many European companies are either subsidiaries of a United States company or are using United States tech103. Firestone Tire, 518 F. Supp. 1021, 1033 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
104. 50 U.S.C. app § 2410(c)(1)(1982); 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b)(3) (1982).
105. 15 C.F.R. § 387.1(b)(3) (1982).
106. Vance, supra note 50, at 214.
107. That Pipeline: Punctured, THE ECONOMIST, June 2, 1982, at 52. Four of our major
European partners, Britain, France, West Germany and Italy, openly defied Reagan's ban on
the pipeline. Id. See also Fromm, Behind Shift to HarderLine in ForeignPolicy, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 16, 1982, at 21.
108. Soviet Pipeline Sanctions: The European Perspective, 1982: Hearings Before the
Joint Economic Comm., 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (statement of Thierg De Montbal) [hereinafter cited as Joint Hearings].
109. Id at 26. The traditional sources of the West are unavailable: Holland's supplies are
dwindling, Norway will not export the necessary level and Nigeria has not progressed far
enough to become a major exporter. Id. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has become a
major source of oil and petroleum products. It is the world's largest producer, averaging 12.5
million barrels per day. It also has the world's largest reserve of natural gas. Wail St. J., June 9,
1983, at 37, col. 2. "
110. Joint Hearings,supra note 108.
111. Id. at 46 (statement of Edmund S. Muskie, former Sec'y of State).
112. Fromm, supra note 107, at 21.
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nology, and these companies have been injured by the ban. Dresser
Industries had to turn down $100 million in orders unrelated to the
pipeline. 113 Caterpillar, an American corporation which supplies pipelayers, lost approximately $90 million because of the sanctions and
additional contracts which had to be abandoned. 14 The Commerce
Department reported that over 224 export licenses, valued at $130
million, have been suspended as a result of the sanctions. These
losses have been spread across a variety of industries which were to
supply parts for the pipeline.'1 5 The Europeans argue that these
losses will be futile because the United States sanctions will merely
encourage the Soviet Union to enlarge its own manufacturing capacity and to accelerate its own turbine and compressor developments,
thus becoming less dependent on western sources. 11 Europeans, Japanese and other foreign sources will also fill in the gaps, undermining
the United States regulations, and this will only serve to injure
American producers.1 17 Europeans will view the United States as an
unreliable trading partner and possibly reduce American
purchases.11 8 Foreign companies will be more reluctant to enter into
licensing or joint-venture projects with American companies because
of the risk of future sanctions by the federal government.1 1 9
The Europeans claim that foreign governments will be inclined to
guard against the possibility of another United States freeze by enacting new legislation giving them increased supervisory powers over
American-owned banks. 12 0 Foreign governments may also be inclined
in the future to hold American parent companies responsible for the
acts of their subsidiaries by applying United States law in reverse.12, 1
There may also be a drop in foreign investments and countermea12 2
sures against state-owned French subsidiaries in the United States.
As a result of the European losses, the sanctions will have been
futile. The sanctions will not delay the completion of the pipeline.12 8
113.

Joint Hearings,supra note 108, at 3 (statement of Senator Jepsen, Vice Chairman).

114. Id. at 6. Caterpillar's international price competitiveness also diminished as a result
of being forced to sacrifice a share of the Soviet market. Id.
115. 1982 Hearings, supra note 6, at 14 (statement of Hon. James L. Buckley, Under
Sec'y of Security Assistance, Science & Technology, Dep't of State). Many of the companies
which are subcontractors or suppliers of components have made investments in the project.
They stand to lose thousands and some will suffer a complete loss of business forcing them into
bankruptcy. Maechling, supra note 14, at 6.

116. Maechling, supra note 14, at 7.
117.

Joint Hearings,supra note 108.

118. Wall St. J., Aug. 27, 1982, at 21, col. 3.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Joint Hearings, supra note 108, at 2 (statement of Rep. Reuss, Chairman).
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The sanctions will only serve to seriously undermine goodwill among
the allies.1 24 Attempts to use sanctions to force changes in Soviet policy usually have not worked and are potentially dangerous.' 25 The
Europeans claim that the United States is staging economic warfare
against the U.S.S.R. to slow down its already weakened economy and
to deny the Soviet Union foreign exchange. 26 Finally, the Europeans
contend that the Soviets will be given the opportunity to pay back
debts owed to the West.127 The Soviet Union will thus become dependent upon the Europeans because in order for the Soviets to buy
grain and industrial goods from the United States and to pay back
debts to the West, they will need the capital generated from the export of oil. In addition, when the Soviet economic situation is
favorable, the quality of life and the measure of freedom improves in

Eastern Bloc countries.'2 8 Thus, if the United States really wants the

Soviet sanctions upon the Polish people eased, it should prevent bans
129

like the pipeline embargo.

XI.

THE UNITED STATES PERSPECTIVE

The United States government's logic in applying sanctions is to
moderate Soviet behavior. The United States wants the end of martial law in Poland, the release of all political prisoners, and the reestablishment of dialogue among the government, Solidarity and the
Church. 30 Regardless of events in Poland, the pipeline sanctions are
also useful to economically contain the Soviet Union.' 31
The main concern of the United States is the risk of western
Europeans becoming dependent on the Soviet Union. The Europeans
are financing their own dependency by lending the Soviet Union
money to build the pipeline and waiting to be repaid with gas from
the completed pipeline. If the Middle East decided to stop supplying
oil to the Europeans, the Soviet Union could endear itself to the
Arabs by adopting a sympathy energy boycott. 32 It would give the
Soviet Union leverage against our allies. 33 Europe would become vul124.
125.
126.

Id.
Id.
Id.

127. Id. at 11 (statement of Andre Fontaire, Editor, La MONDE).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Reuss, Chairman).
130. 1982 Hearings, supra note 6, at 16 (statement of Hon. James L. Buckley).
131. Sanctions, supra note 20, at 30.
132. Joint Hearings, supra note 108, at 9 (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins).
133. 1982 Hearings, supra note 6, at 164 (article by Stein, Economics and National Security, TuE EcoNoMisT, Apr. 1982, at 163).
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nerable for a number of reasons. First, gas is an extremely difficult
fuel to replace in a short time. Second, certain regions of western
Europe will become dependent upon the Soviet supply of gas, and as
a result, might apply strong pressure on their governments to avoid
actions which might threaten the flow of gas.134 Even though Europe
itself will be dependent upon the Soviet Union for fifty percent of its
total energy consumption, regions like Bavaria will depend upon Soviet gas for approximately thirty percent of their total needs.'
Third, residential and commercial customers will become especially
dependent upon the pipeline since thirty percent of the gas from the
pipeline is expected to be used by these sectors.136 The two potential
dangers resulting from this vulnerability are: first, that the U.S.S.R.
will pressure western countries by exercising gas leverage; and, second, that it will try to manipulate the western commercial and financial systems through its hard currency earnings from the pipeline. 3 7
The Soviet Union has a long history of exerting political pressure by
cutting off exports to countries. 3 " The U.S.S.R. and its satellites used
western technology during the 1970's to achieve major goals which
presently threaten the free world.139 These include the acceleration
by the Soviet Bloc of accumulations of technology to modernize its
defense.14 0 The Soviet Union has imported technology in the areas of
computer semiconductors, chemicals and heavy vehicle manufacturing; increased its political influence in strategic areas of the third
world through commercial and diplomatic tracks; 141 and finally, used
western technology to build up its forces to invade unstable coun1 42
tries, and to support terrorism and revolution in the third world.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union has been careful to minimize its
vulnerability level by producing its own agricultural products and industrial technologies as quickly as possible. 43 Thus, the United
States is worried; not that the Soviets will cut off the supplies, but
that they will increase the supplies, making Europe even more depen14
dent upon them. 1
Detente is another area of conflict between the United States and
134.

Id. at 165.

135. Id.
136. Id.
137.
138.

1982 Hearings, supra note 6.
Id. (statement of Hon. James L. Buckley).

139. Id. These credits were obtained partly through official credit and partly through
western credits.

140. Id.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Europe. The Europeans argue that detente is a worthy goal. But
many Americans think that detente has only improved the standard
of living in the Soviet Union and has not lessened Soviet aggression.14 5 Historic examples of this result clearly exist. During periods
of detente, the Soviet Union invaded Czechoslovakia, increased Soviet defense spending, invaded Afghanistan, and repressed freedom
and liberty in Poland. 146 The Soviets have also developed their nuclear arsenal during periods of detente and have tried to keep the
United States from developing its arsenal. 14 Western Europe's preoccupation with detente indicates to Americans that Europeans are
only interested in economic self-preservation resulting in a dangerous
down-grading of security. 4 8 The prevailing attitude of the western
Europeans is that they will have nothing to do with American risks
outside Europe.14 9
The United States believes that the Soviet Union's goal is to split
the alliance by concentrating on the differences between Europe and
the United States. 150 The U.S.S.R. is succeeding through the pipeline
deal. Through the Soviet strategy of "peace offensives," it has initiated one of the most intensive and comprehensive moves toward
world domination. 51 1 The prospect of Finlandization grows nearer.1 51
Leaders in the Soviet Union know that to remain a world power, it
must develop its resources in Siberia. 3 Thus, by making the deal
look attractive to the Europeans, the Soviet Union will use this leverage from the oil to exert political pressure.115 By persuading Europe
to buy oil from them, the Soviets are keeping Europe from develop145. Joint Hearings, supra note 108, at 8 (statement of Sen. Paula Hawkins).
146. Id. at 9. It has also extended its rule over Indochina, Ethiopia, Cuba, Afghanistan
and a list of other countries. Id. at 12 (statement of Andra Fontaine). It also has attempted to
destabilize Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia and other African nations through Soviet proxies.

Id.
147. Id. at 12.
148. Joint Hearings, supra note 108, at 16 (statement of Andrew Knight, Editor, THE

ECONOMIST).
149. United States-Western Europe Relations in 1980: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Europe & the Middle East of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1980)
(statement of Simon H. Serfaty, Director, Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, John
Hopkins University) [hereinafter cited as House Hearings].
150. Rachwald, The Soviet Approach to West Europe, CuRRENT HISTORY, Oct. 1983, at
309.
151. Id.
152. House Hearings,supra note 149, at 33 (statement of Simon H. Serfaty). Finlandization means that the Soviet Union uses the strategy of the phase of a peace loving nation in
order to maneuver the allies into thinking it wants peace and trusting and becoming dependent
upon the Soviets. Id.
153. 1981 Hearings, supra note 4, at 122 (statement of Lawrence Brader, Ass't Sec'y,
Dep't of Commerce).
154. Id.
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ing alternative sources of energy in Europe, the United States and
Africa.
Besides the reasons already stated, the pipeline would also provide the Soviet Union with foreign exchange earnings, which it desperately needs; it would maintain and enhance its control over Eastern Europe; it would aid the Soviets with their economic problems;
and it would expose western European banks to possible financial
ruin. 155 Currently, the United States believes that with the help of
our allies, the West has a chance to squeeze the Soviets. 156 But a
157
unity of purpose and an alliance of goals is necessary.

XII.

Do

SANCTIONS WORK?

The question of whether sanctions are successful in punishing a
target country is a controversial one. Some critics believe that sanctions can never be successful while others believe they can. Three
types of benefits or achievements result from sanctions. The first possible result is the end of the target country's offending policy. 158 This
is extremely difficult to accomplish and is a remote possibility. The
second possible result is that sanctions for the offending policy will
impose a high cost upon the target countries' continuation of that
policy. " " The third possible result is the potential indirect impact
upon the target country.1 06 For example, the sanctions may indicate
to the world public disapproval for specific conduct and may further
deter such activities. But in order for the sanctions to be effective,
there must be cooperation from alternative supply countries, a careful statement of objectives, a focusing upon the specific known dependency of the target country and selective, infrequent impositions.161 A critical element underlying the above criteria is the
vulnerability of the target country. Export controls work best against
smaller, weak economies because they can be isolated from outside
support of another country.1 62 This factor also aids executive flexibility in exerting pressure in foreign affairs activities. Economic sanctions accomplish this by offering obvious advantages over the use of
155.
156.

Id. at 1 (statement of Chairman Garn).
Wall St. J., Sept. 17, 1982, at 1, col. 1.

157. Id.
158.
(1980).
159.

Doxey, Economic Sanctions: Benefits and Costs, 36 THE WORLD TODAY 484, 485
Id. at 485.

160. Id. at 486.
161.

Moyer & Mabry, supra note 88, at 169.

162. 1982 Hearings, supra note 6, at 227 (article by Charles Mc C. Mathias, Jr., in
Appendix).
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military or diplomatic force. Finally, economic sanctions are the most
appropriate and least costly vehicle for expressing official outrage and
opposition.'I s
6 4
On the other hand, sanctions are extremely difficult to enforce.'
Some critics argue that they treat symptoms and not causes.' 6 5 With
a major world power, such as the Soviet Union, economic sanctions
alone are seldom sufficient to induce major political changes.' 66 The
economic effect of export controls on a target country usually is a
limited because of the minimal cooperation of other countries willing
to supply the same product being withheld.1 17 The economic sanctions must totally deprive the target country of some product, technology or commodity crucial to an economically significant project.' 68
Sanctions can only do this if either the country imposing the controls
has a monopoly on the embargoed items or alternative suppliers join
in the sanctions. 0 9
Another reason why sanctions have a limited impact is because
large countries like the Soviet Union are well insulated from economic sanctions. 7 0° Major countries can insulate themselves from adverse effects of a sanction by having a stable and diversified economy,
a centrally-planned economy, a low volume of import trade and thus
a low dependency level upon other sources, or by producing most of
17
what is imported or that which is embargoed. '
A target country can also reduce the sanction's damaging effects
by obtaining the sanctioned product from other sources. Many countries which have the embargoed technology are willing to replace the
product in return for high economic benefits.
In examining whether a sanction is successful, the costs of imposing a sanction is an important consideration. The costs are usually
72
large, long-term and substantially hidden, yet they are inescapable.'
The economic costs include: budgetary costs, the cost of lost transactions, the cost of damaged business relations, and the cost of lost
market shares.'" The noneconomic costs are international frictions,
national political tensions and the deflated value resulting from re163.
164.
(Winter).
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Miller, When Sanctions Worked, 1980 FOREIGN POLICY 118, 126 (Summer).
Stevenson, Toward a More Rational East-West Trade Policy, 1983 J. LEGIS. 11, 25
1982 Hearings,supra note 6, at 227.
Miller, supra note 163.
Moyer & Mabry, supra note 88, at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 146.
Id.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
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peatedly using sanctions.17 4 Loss is sustained from both economic
and noneconomic costs by those countries imposing the sanctions, by
third-party countries and by the target country.17 5 These losses include an elimination or reduction in trade resulting in the loss of millions of dollars, a limitation in or blockage of tourism and communication, and assistance in the transfer of technology.17 6 There can also
be an adverse effect upon the entire international economic flow, especially if the target country is a vital link, through the blocking of
channels of exchange, the loss of certainty, the loss of confidence, and
the deemphasis on trade coupled with an increasing emphasis on self1 77
sufficiency.
The United States sanctions relating to the building of the Yamal
pipeline have had some effect but it has been limited.1 78 They have
caused damage to the Soviet Union but have also caused significant
damage to both the United States and Europe. In effect, the question is not whether sanctions work, but whether the possible effects
are worth the costs to the parties involved.

XIII. SOLUTIONS
In order to prevent problems such as the ones resulting from the
pipeline sanctions, the United States must look to future solutions.
One such solution is that the United States must insure its own energy independence. 18 0 Energy in a modern industrialized society is of
the essence. 18 ' Many predict the next major war will be fought over
control of the world's energy resources. 182 Unless the United States
desires to become crippled as a world power, energy is the key. 8 3 To
accomplish this independence, Americans must change their energyuse pattern; total consumption must decline and greater conservation
must increase. Alternative technologies such as coal and nuclear fuel
must be aggressively pursued, and other techniques such as solar and
wind should be seriously explored and rapidly commercialized. 8
Currently, the United States is doing very little to explore these areas
174.
175.
176.

Id.
Doxey, supra note 158, at 486.
Id.

177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 488.
Joint Hearings, supra note 108, at 2 (statement of Rep. Reuss, Chairman).

181.

Id.

Id.
Rooney, supra note 1, at 23.

182. Id. at 22.
183. Id. at 23.

184. Id.
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of energy.1 85 On the other hand, the Soviet Union is the only major
super power besides Canada almost exclusively energy independent
of the Middle East.18 6 The U.S.S.R. also actively explores the multitude of alternative fuel resources for the future. 187
The United States must also encourage its allies to develop their
alternative sources of oil and gas. They need to expand their stock
reserves, expand North Sea gas developments, integrate their pipeline system to allow maximum flexibility in reallocating gas supplies,
and create gas reserves.18 8 Another alternative for European oil and
gas needs is to develop the resources in Norway and Nigeria.' 8 9 The
United States also has the ability to supply energy resources to Europe.' 90 It has already decontrolled domestic oil prices and has taken
the necessary steps toward the leasing of federal lands. 191 To substitute the need for Siberian natural gas, Europe could rely on western
coal deposits, synthetic fuel and natural gas supplies within a rela192
tively short period of time.
If the Europeans continue to insist upon the building of the Soviet pipeline, the United States should encourage them to finance the
pipeline in a way in which they can retain control of the necessary
assets for as long as possible.'13 This would enable them to not only
protect their security but also to prevent unexpected price increases,
and would limit other price charges the U.S.S.R. could use to pressure Europe into additional loans and commitments.

XIV.

EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS

European corporations adversely affected by a United States embargo also could be compensated by the United States. Price supports or loan rates could be increased. 19 4 Insurance could also be provided for exports of sensitive items to sensitive locations. 9 5 Another
alternative is an assumption of risk theory; the American government
185. Id. at 24. Nuclear power represents only 3.6% of total United States energy consumption and 13% of all electric consumption. Id.
186. Id.
187. DIA: Soviets will Meet Energy Targets, 1981 Om. & GAs J. 94 (Sept. 21).
188. Rooney, supra note 1, at 25.
189. 1981 Hearings, supra note 4 (statement by Anthony H. Cordesman).
190. Id. (testimony of Rubert D. Hormats, Ass't Sec'y of State for Economic & Business
Affairs). Norway seems to have the resource potential to supply Europe with more gas than it
needs. Nigeria is preparing to export large quantities of liquified natural gas by the late 1980's.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (statement by Anthony H. Cordesman).
195. Id.
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would assume liability for its own acts of state for losses incurred by
corporations.19 6 Either the federal courts or the
Foreign Claims Set197
tlement Commission could review the claims.
The United States should also encourage NATO and the European Economic Community to intervene in trade transactions with
international implications. These agencies should be responsible for
tracking the progress of matters such as the Soviet pipeline and for
reporting any danger before it occurs. 198 The United States should
constantly ensure that the pipeline issue remains before the world
and that Europe takes the necessary safeguards to avoid further dependence upon the Soviet Union.1 99
Another important consideration is United States negotiation
with its allies before imposing sanctions having such an adverse effect
upon them. The West should begin discussions on the future strategy
of East-West trade relations, to achieve optimum success in the future. 200 The United States must pay more attention to building an
international consensus and take fewer unilateral actions which generate disharmony.0 1 Consistency is needed in western policy towards
the Soviet Union.20 2
Finally, and most importantly, Congress should limit the application of the E.A.A. Foreign policy controls should be eliminated or
limited so as not to violate international law. 0s The government
should be required and not merely encouraged to consult with American industry before imposing economic sanctions.20 4 A limit upon residential authority in implementing the sanctions is recommended.
Sanctions should only be encouraged in times of absolute necessity
and not at the mere caprice of the resident.

XV.

CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, the United States will continue to use embargoes as
retaliatory weapons or as devices for influencing decision-making
abroad. However, the United States should be careful not to overextend its exercise of authority to ensure"the efficacy of this embargo.
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Such exercise of authority in direct derogation of customary international legal norms could have serious repercussions for the United
States in its dealings with other nations. A greater understanding of
the limitations inherent within the E.A.A. and the parameters of extraterritorial application of authority should preempt any future attempts by the United States to repeat its behavior with regard to the
Soviet pipeline embargo.
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